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I. Introduction 
 Dr. John Marburger’s recent calls for a new science of science policy open up 
new opportunities to reconceptualize, retest, and revise as needed the theories, models, 
descriptions, and mainstream propositions underlying United States’ science and innovation 
policies and programs.  
We respond to these calls by presenting a research agenda directed at two objectives. 
First, as academic researchers who have long worked in the field of science and innovation 
policy, albeit from different analytical and disciplinary perspectives, we seek to insure that 
efforts to promote the “science” of science and technology, or innovation policy produce 
substantive scholarly work that in fact advances our fundamental understanding of underlying 
processes. Second, as participants in numerous  U.S. and international science and innovation  
policy  advisory forums and commissions, we seek to promote a closer, better fitting,  coupling 
between the research communities who are addressing questions of the science of science policy 
-- themselves a disparate disciplinary lot -- with the policy communities who are seeking 
improved understandings of whether or how the decisions they have made or are being called 
upon to make in fact have led to the intended results. Our strategy to achieve these two 
objectives is to identify questions that are simultaneously intellectually challenging and policy 
relevant.    
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The earliest formulations of the call for a new science of science policy emphasized 
“models”, especially those that might be helpful in answering questions concerning the total 
level of Federal investments in r&d and their allocation among fields. Implicitly, this formulation 
defined science as logical constructs about the workings of the U.S. science and innovation 
system that led to the formulation of testable, verifiable predictions of the consequences of 
adopting a specific course of action, relative to alternatives.  
Science and innovation policies, indeed, are the articulation, explicitly or implicitly, of 
theoretical propositions. Some propositions are well documented, and have induced widespread 
consensus---e.g., contributions of public r&d expenditures to aggregate economic growth. Others 
remain in dispute or disagreement—e.g., crowding out effects of public investments in private 
sector technology programs. Others remain to be tested, or cannot be tested until well after large 
public investments have been made—e.g., direct contributions to knowledge and indirect 
contributions to other societal objectives from investments in elementary particle physics. 
A science of science and innovation policy must address these and other equally 
differentiated questions. Consequently, it must be equivalently diverse and flexible in conceptual 
framework and methodology.  We thus adopt here a broader, more eclectic definition of science 
than suggested by the concept of model, alone.  
Our working concept of rigorous research in science and innovation policy includes 
description, taxonomy and data collection and analysis, as well as theory construction, 
hypothesis formulation and testing, and normative analysis. We do this in part to more fully and 
accurately describe the methodologies that can contribute to top quality research. We also do this 
to insure that the research base so developed is applicable to the broad set of societal objectives 
for which public funds are invested in science and technology. Research in this area can inform 
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policy in many ways, including both prediction and enlightenment. Seeing the system through 
new eyes can be as important as modeling it quantitatively.  
We start from the broad “policy for science” issues relating to the structure of the U.S. 
science and innovation system, move to principles concerning rationales for public investments 
in research and development, then to operational matters, and finally widen this domestic 
orientation to place the U.S. in a global science and innovation system. The proposed research 
agenda, not surprisingly, includes longstanding questions, standard issues restated to account for 
changed environmental conditions, and combinations of familiar issues that produce new issues. 
Left open for further treatment is the construction of a research agenda for “science in policy”, 
especially how best to account for the use, nonuse, or misuse of science by policy makers in 
shaping public policies.  
II. A Research Agenda 
1. U.S. National Innovation System.         
Even as the metaphor and implicit model of a  U.S. national innovation system within 
which different sectors are funded to perform specific roles and which connect, tightly or 
loosely, to one another in well-known ways, continues to be wisely used, increased discontent is 
being voiced the model’s  descriptive or analytical adequacy. As expressed in two recent 
National Academies reports, Measuring Research and Development Expenditures in the U.S. 
Economy (2004) and Understanding Business Dynamics, (2007), there is increased recognition 
that the categories underpinning the surveys that flesh out the model are outdated. Measuring 
R&D, for example, notes that the models of innovation that underlie the data are “… 
increasingly unrepresentative of the whole of the R&D enterprise,” omitting such factors as “the 
growth of the service sector, the growing … role of small firms in R&D, the shift in funding 
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from manufacturing R&D to health-related R&D, changes in geographic location and the 
globalization of R&D.” Further, some innovation scholars (for example, von Hippel (2006) are 
describing new modes of innovation that are not centered at all on corporate R&D and therefore 
obviate traditional vocabulary and concepts.  
Without contemporary concepts for the workings of r&d in the economy, assessments of 
existing policies and predictions about the effects of new proposals can be misleading. Studies 
for example abound of the impacts of the Bayh-Dole Act’s on university patenting and licensing. 
These studies however have little to say about whether university behaviors are leading to 
changes in the behavior of globally positioned r&d-intensive firms, which now report 
substituting university and research scientists in other countries for U.S. faculty and universities. 
Even less consideration has been given to the possible long term effects caused by such a 
substitution upon the strengthening of the academic research infrastructure of these countries that 
may reduce the flow of foreign nationals to U.S. universities for graduate degree training, 
followed in turn by the loss to the U.S. of the contribution these individuals make as 
entrepreneurs or faculty. 
Simple, perennial issues, but ones for which reliable, consistent answers remain difficult 
to provide.  
2. Rethinking/Reviewing the Rationales for U.S. Science and Innovation Policies 
National and state science and innovation policies and programs are a concatenation of 
big and small theories. “Big” theories   include the contributions that science and technology 
have made and are projected to make—indeed are deemed as essential inputs--to overarching 
national interests, such as national defense, economic growth and international competitiveness 
and growth, and the inherent quest by members of a society to more fully understand the 
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workings of the universe which they inhabit. Small rationales include the lure of scientific or 
technological opportunities—realistic or fanciful; various forms of geographic, institutional, 
demographic equity; and episodic analytical or policy fads. 
Some combinations of the above are logically consistent, derived from theories of 
processes of  scientific and technological discovery,  suboptimal levels of private sector 
investment, and the contributions of scientific and technological innovation to national and/or 
regional economic growth; many are opportunistic or symbolic; a goodly number are 
inconsistent, requiring agencies and performers to torque their activities to meet wasteful, vague, 
or counterproductive performance expectations and outcomes.  
 This critique is double-edged, pointing both to the prospects of analytically flawed 
rejection and endorsement of policies and programs. As brief examples, the market failure 
paradigm continues to dominate OMB’s formulation of its R&D Investment Criteria, and thus 
PART reviews for many federal agencies, even as contemporary economic analysis emphasizes 
the unlikelihood that there is any production function, as Foray has phrased it, “that can be used 
to forecast, even approximately, the effect that a unit of knowledge will have on economic 
performance.”   Conversely, if one likes, statements that existing programs are “working” are 
analytically vacuous without explicit statements of program objectives, predetermined agreement 
upon what constitutes success, use of comparison or control groups in evaluations, and 
consideration of foregone alternatives. 
These observations point to the need for a two-part research approach: first,  following 
Will Roger’s adage that its not what we don’t know that hurts us but the things we know that 
ain’t so, reconsideration of the rationales for existing programs and contemporary proposals in 
light of emerging, empirically-tested findings and new analytical methodologies; second, 
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systematic examination of the how and why theories and findings concerning the design and 
impacts of science and technology policies are used across levels of the Federal government.    
3. Setting Research Priorities and Selection Mechanisms 
The core challenges in setting priorities for allocating resources to fundamental science 
remain the presence of uncertainty about which lines of inquiry will yield the most important 
advances in understanding of natural and social phenomena, and the lack of consensus that can 
exist at times about onward directions suggested by initial sightings at the frontier.  In this 
respect, Dr. Marburger’s 2002 call for a new science of science policy that provided for “… a 
systematic way of ordering the opportunities so finite resources can be invested to best effect”, 
sounds a familiar refrain that dates back to at least to the 1960s, when Alvin Weinberg’s 
advanced his intrinsic and extrinsic criteria for scientific choice (Weinberg, 1963; 1964). In 
effect, many of the evaluative and predictive techniques of recent years, e.g.,  bibliometrics, 
patent analyses, foresight,  roadmaping, etc. have been designed to provide evidence of past and 
current performance to better inform prospective actions. But one interpretation of recent calls 
for new models is an assessment that little if any progress has been made over the past 40 years, 
at least at the level of program and budget detail needed, or desired, by policy makers.  
Our interest here is more than an assessment of past progress; rather it is to suggest the 
need to think ahead if current and future initiatives directed at producing more accurate 
predictive models prove chimerical. For example, a recent  National Academies report, A 
Strategy for Assessing Science (2007), has concluded that “No theory exists that can reliably 
predict which research activities are most likely to lead to scientific advances or to societal 
benefit” (p. 89). 
 7
 This assessment may be too pessimistic in forecasting what new theoretical or 
methodological pathways for forecasting and prioritizing science priorities lie just ahead. It also 
may set too high a standard for the form and content of the models and algorithms needed by 
policy makers to have increased ex ante confidence in the wisdom of their decisions and ex post 
records of success in having made the right investments—the perfect being the enemy of the 
good.        
But accepting these assessments as valid, at least for the near term, means that answers to 
the science and technology policy questions cited above will likely continue to be made on the 
basis on a combination of expert judgment and competitive, peer review processes. Our own 
experiences as participants and researchers attests to the desirability and effectiveness of these 
processes, especially, in most cases, with alternatives such as earmarking or set asides.  
This endorsement however does not constitute an uncritical reaffirmation of the views 
expressed in  recent reports that expert review is the most effective means of evaluating federally 
funded research programs or that peer, merit review is an international gold standard for review 
of science and engineering proposals. The limitations of these mechanisms, at least as 
conventionally implemented, are increasingly evident in at least 3 important science and 
technology policy settings: (1) forecasting trends in fundamental research not only within but 
across fields of science; (2) receptivity to discontinuous, radical, transformative research; (3) 
receptivity to interdisciplinary research 
Relatedly, a recent stream of empirical research and participant observation has called 
attention to the dependence of the outcomes generated by expert/merit review panels to panelist 
attitudes towards scientific risk and their cognitive maps concerning the structure of knowledge; 
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small group dynamics; the number and ordering of criteria; voting rules; instructions provided by 
funding agencies; role of program managers--and other factors.  
In the spirit of a science of science and innovation policy, these concerns and findings 
should be seen as framing a research agenda that seeks to examine the inner workings of expert 
judgment/peer review processes.  Numerous modifications or variants of existing expert/peer 
review procedures exist. These include criteria for selecting participants, voting rules, or even 
allowing for a modicum of randomness in the selection of proposals. A science of science policy 
needs to allow for experimentation. Each of these proposals may be seen a hypothesis about how 
to improve outcomes. They need to be tested.  
4. Human Resources. 
If there is one area of STI policy where there should be a solid research base, this is it. In 
fact, as highlighted in recent congressional testimony and reports, policy prescriptions relating to 
“shortages” or “surpluses” in scientific and technical personnel are beset with conceptual and 
empirical problems. Recent legislation, however well intentioned, points though to a continuing 
propensity to make policy on the basis on simple solutions and simple formula. The empirical 
and analytic support underlying the Gathering Storm report was weak, for example.  The report 
made little use of major human resource surveys with roots as far back as the 1950s and 
subsequent research by sociologists and economists that provide important insights into s&t 
career patterns. These studies have tracked the steady influx of white women into science and 
engineering careers in the U.S., and punctured various myths.  
Research on the s&t labor force also wears thin in addressing the challenge of how the 
Federal government can most effectively pursue national s&t objectives in the context of historic 
divisions across levels of government for K-12 education, and distributed responsibilities among 
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agencies, primarily as between the National Science Foundation and the Department of 
Education. COMPETES  proposes major infusions of Federal funds to increase the number of 
math and science teachers in K-12 education; at question though are the basis for its specific 
numerical objectives and the effectiveness of the math and science education programs it seeks 
to foster.   
The (unfavorable) international comparisons that underpin much contemporary discourse 
and policy also suggest deeper strata of causation than obvious through test scores or graduation 
rates alone.  Many OECD countries are facing a science and engineering recruitment challenge 
that looks much like the U.S. These also are “advanced” economies, in which bright young 
people can obtain much better salaries in service industries than they would earn in science or 
engineering careers. A reasonable hypothesis is that this major structural shift in the global 
economy is connected to the recruitment issues, but the S&T policy research communities have 
barely begun to look at the connections or begin to generate policy options under these 
conditions.  
5. Defense R&D  
The statistic that most sharply separates public sector r&d in the U.S. from that of other 
industrialized economies is the higher percent allocated to defense related ends.  Defense r&d 
needs more systematic attention precisely because it is such a large portion of total Federal r&d 
and thus potentially has impacts on the performance of the larger U.S. science, technology and 
innovation. In particular, improved models and methods are needed to test hypothesis concerning 
the impacts of military r&d on non-defense technological innovation, the competitiveness of 
U.S. industries, regional growth patterns, and the recruitment, training and distribution of s&t 
personnel.  
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For example, well documented examples exist of major industries that have started or 
been sustained by military R&D, including the computer and aerospace industries. On the other 
hand, efforts of major defense contractors to diversify into the civilian sectors suggests that 
military requirements often do not stimulate the development of products that can survive in 
civilian markets.  Relatedly, military installations are spread around the country, but military 
laboratories and contractors are more spatially concentrated. Does the R&D-intensive side of 
military activity produce different effects in local economies than a more standard installation?  
6. Political Science of Science and Innovation Policy 
Science policy, as directed towards the attainment of specific national objectives and the 
production of benefits for different constituencies, is manifestly a political process. It reflects the 
interaction of national objectives and local interests, the structures and workings of Congress, the 
Executive, and Federal agencies, as influenced by various constituencies, as well at any point in 
time of the sway of partisan control and dominant ideologies. All this is obvious. 
What is less obvious-or at least not systematically understood- is how these actors and 
factors interact at various points in time to produce specific outcomes. Retrospectively, one can 
perhaps account for the constellation of influences that led to the doubling of NIH’s 
appropropriations. Is it though simply a matter of “balance”  that pending Federal budget 
proposals call for substantial increases in funding for the physical sciences and engineering (and 
thus the Department of Energy, NIST, and NSF) while NIH’s funding is essentially static? Is it 
instead  something else  or different, relating to the dynamics shaping the formation, force, and 
staying power of coalitions of interest, as suggested in recent theoretically sophisticated and 
empirically rich public economics and political science literatures?. More importantly, given the 
widespread view that these sharp discontinuities have been inefficient—leading alternately to 
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feast and famine conditions that disrupt scientific careers and induce under- and over-investment 
in physical infrastructure, what changes, if any, in the structures, processes, or criteria by which 
the executive and legislative branches form science and innovation policies and budgets might 
produce a more efficient and stable funding pattern? 
Similarly, with a view towards understanding, and to a degree predicting, the outcomes of 
the dynamics of political processes upon science and technology policy, how are coalitions of 
interest formed to champion or oppose specific initiatives?  For example, what coalitions, pro 
and con, might be expected to form, using what arguments and with what influence, around 
recently advanced proposals to increase the SBIR set aside above 2.5%? 
8. Performance: Expectations, Accomplishments, and Assessment  
How are expectations for gauging the performance of the U.S. scientific enterprise, in its 
totality or with respect to any specific field of science or performing sector set? What criteria are 
appropriate for gauging performance, effectiveness, or success? 
Of especial import here is how the claims on behalf of basic science investments are 
made.  A notable and commendable feature of recent proposals for increased U.S. investments in 
elementary particle physics and plasma science is that they have not been cast in terms of direct 
or near-term links to technological innovation and economic competitiveness. But how then 
justify not only initial commitments but end state outcomes? 
A different set of performance issues surfaces sharply for a cross-section of Federal 
technology or academic research programs.  What constitutes “evidence” of success, 
effectiveness, or efficiency? Compared to what questions have loomed large in PART reviews 
and in evaluations of  the Advanced Technology Program, Manufacturing Extension Program, 
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Small Business Innovation Research Program, and the Experimental Programs to Stimulate 
Competitive Research of several agencies. 
Any large-scale program, whether measured by amount of dollars expended or 
participating entities can be expected to generate some number of positive results—success 
stories—be it in terms of newly competitive firms, singular faculty or institutional research 
awards, or start up of new firms. Conversely, the inherent uncertainties surrounding r&d, 
especially basic research undertakings, implies some  number or percent of “unsuccessful” 
projects. Absent clearly defined expectations and initial agreements on what science and 
technology programs are designed to achieve, current reviews of Federal science and technology 
undertakings, whether by OMB or via Congressional hearings, are guaranteed to produce 
findings that accommodate differing positions.  
9. U.S. Science and Innovation Policy in an International Setting 
How do U.S. investments in science and technology co-evolve with the larger society, 
national and global? As recently as a decade ago, the leaders of the U.S. science and engineering 
enterprise listed “world leadership” among their goals. Yet as the evidence of growing strength 
elsewhere mounts, the U.S. clearly needs to plan for a future in which it is among the world 
leaders, rather than the dominant force, in most areas of science and engineering. Does, for 
example, the earlier formulation that the U.S. should seek to be a leader in some fields of science 
and a fast second in others still hold, given the high costs of major scientific undertakings, 
increased patterns of international scientific cooperation, polycentric location of r&d laboratories 
by multinational firms, emergence of new and potentially significant contributors to international 
science, such as China and India, and rapid diffusion and transfer of scientific and technological 
knowledge across national borders? What strategic principles should guide U.S. science and 
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technology policy in a world increasing characterized by complex sets of interactions – partly 
cooperative, partly competitive, partly independent – with other countries?  
These questions also spill over to innovation policy and the import of the above trends on 
U.S. economic competitiveness. For example, if scientific leadership shifts to other countries, are 
U.S. industries equipped to be fast followers: is their absorptive capacity equal to their 
innovative capacity? Will U.S. universities be as capable of providing a window on the rest of 
the world as they have been of providing a window for the rest of the world? Under what 
conditions will U.S.-based economic activities thrive in the new, open, global economy? 
Research on these topics has to move fast to keep up with the changing realities. But 
existing national industry surveys do not do much to track international patterns, and national 
data sets on the workforce include scant information on the increasing flows of scientists and 
engineers between countries and regions. With a few exceptions, the research on international 
collaboration in science and technology is not charting this process. Part of that literature focuses 
on international collaboration in Big Science, a game that mostly the rich countries play. A large 
part draws on evaluations of foreign aid programs and thus neglects he much larger pattern of 
technology transfer through multinational firms. The literature that exists on the latter tends to 
focus on local firms in developing countries; the U.S. angle still needs to be addressed. 
There is thus considerable scope for new research on the S&T elements of relationships 
in a developing world economy. Since the dominant theoretical model relies on the idea of 
science as a self-organizing system, there is plenty of scope for testing the effect of policy 
interventions in that system. Mapping technology transfer through its public and private routes 
will be an important part of the agenda, and studying the conditions under which technology 




Many items on the above agenda are familiar ones, but this should not be a surprise. 
Their inclusion essentially reflects the challenges that researchers and policy makers confront as 
they try to reduce the uncertainties and complexities surrounding processes of scientific 
discovery, technological innovation, and the ways in which new things impact upon a society 
into operational policies and programs.  
Given these challenges, modest expectations about outcomes are in order by those calling 
for and funding the new science of science and innovation policy. Perhaps even more so, 
modesty may be needed on the part of those advancing claims about new and improved theories, 
models, or algorithms. Whether the current initiative for a science of science policy will succeed 
or fail is likely to depend less on having more pieces of research to play with as on how well the 
pieces are put together. We have tried to indicate here that the pieces currently available to fill 
some parts of the picture in detail and leave others blank. Agreeing with Dr. Marburger’s call for 
evidence-based policy, we believe that a deeper dialogue between policy and research 
communities across many venues is a necessary precondition for completing the puzzle 
successfully. 
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